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Trade and the Competitiveness Agenda
José Guilherme Reis and Thomas Farole
Export-Led Growth, the Crisis, and the End 
of an Era
The dramatic expansion in global trade over recent decades
has contributed significantly to diversification, growth, and
poverty reduction in many developing countries. This period
of rapid export growth has been enabled by two critical
structural changes in global trade: (1) the vertical and spatial
fragmentation  of  manufacturing  into  highly  integrated
“global production networks,” and (2) the rise of services
trade and the growth of “offshoring.” Both of these, in turn,
were made possible by major technological revolutions; and
they were supported by multilateral trade policy reforms
and broad liberalizations in domestic trade and investment
environments worldwide.
The global economic crisis came crashing into the middle
of this long-running export-led growth party during 2008
and 2009. Between the last quarter of 2007 and the second
quarter of 2009, global trade contracted by 36 percent. But
as the recovery started to strengthen in 2010 (at least until
the clouds began to form over Europe), the longer-term im-
pacts of the crisis on the policy environment regarding trade
and growth were becoming more apparent. Indeed, in addi-
tion to raising concerns over the global commitment to trade
liberalization, the crisis has also led to some serious rethink-
ing  of  some  of  the  conventional  wisdom  regarding  the
growth agenda—the most important result of which is the
likelihood that governments will play a much more activist
role in the coming years. There are three principal reasons
why governments are likely to be more actively involved in
industrial and trade policy in the coming years. 
First, the crisis has undone faith in markets and discred-
ited laissez-faire approaches that rely simply on trade policy
liberalization. Instead, governments and local markets have
been “rediscovered.” In this sense, the demand for activist
government is likely to go well beyond financial markets and
regulation, and it will affect the policy environment in which
trade and industrial strategies are designed.
Second, the crisis has highlighted the critical importance
of diversification (of sectors, products, and trading partners)
in reducing the risks of growth volatility. The recent era of
globalization contributed to substantial specialization of
The global economic crisis has forced a major rethinking of the respective roles of governments and markets in the
processes of trade and growth. Indeed, industrial policy seems to be back in fashion—or, at least, talking about it is.
But a renewed “activism” by government in the trade and growth agenda need not mean a return to old-style
policies of import substitution and “picking winners.” Instead, it may mean a stronger focus on competitiveness by
unlocking the constraints to private sector–led growth. This note discusses the renewed role of government in trade
and growth policy from the competitiveness angle, and it suggests some priorities for the new competitiveness agenda.
Smart Tax Administration
Richard Bird
The “smartest” development policy needs to be underpinned by “smart” tax policy. However, the best tax policy in the world 
is worth little if it cannot be implemented effectively. What can be done, to a considerable extent, inevitably determines what 
is done. Increasing tax revenues requires an effective tax administration: new taxpayers must be identified and brought into 
the tax net, and new collection techniques developed. Implementing such changes invariably takes time. 
Three ingredients are essential to effective tax administration:
political will, a clear strategy, and adequate resources. 
If the political will exists, the blueprint for effective tax ad-
ministration is relatively straightforward. The tax administra-
tion should be given an appropriate institutional form—which 
may (or may not) mean a separate revenue authority, as dis-
cussed later. It should be adequately staffed with trained offi-
cials. It should be properly organized, which usually means an 
organizational structure based on function or client groups (for 
example, large and small taxpayer offices) rather than on a tax-
by-tax basis. Computerization and appropriate use of modern 
information  technology  are  important,  but  these  improve-
ments must be carefully integrated into the tax administration. 
Putting all this into place takes time, resources, direction, and 
effort. But it can be done, and it pays off, as demonstrated by 
countries from Singapore to Chile.
Why Tax Administration Matters
How a tax system is administered affects its yield, its incidence, 
and its efficiency. Administration that is unfair and capricious 
may bring the tax system into disrepute and weaken the legiti-
macy of government. For instance, in many transitional coun-
tries in the 1990s, the failure to improve tax administration 
when new tax structures were introduced resulted in very un-
even tax imposition, widespread tax evasion, and lower than 
anticipated revenue. In some developing countries, corporate 
tax liabilities are often negotiated rather than calculated as set 
out in the law. In some countries, bribery is so common that it 
is considered a regular part of the compensation of tax officials. 
Such corruption undermines confidence in the tax system, af-
fects willingness to pay taxes, and reduces a country’s capacity 
to finance government expenditures. How revenue is raised—
the effect of revenue-generation effort on equity, on the politi-
cal fortunes of the government, and on the level of economic 
welfare—may in some ways be equally (or more) important as 
how much revenue is raised.
Tax administration is a difficult task even in the best of 
times and in the best of places, and conditions in developing 
countries seldom match these specifications. Assessing the rela-
tionship between administrative effort and revenue outcome—
let alone other possible policy objectives such as procedural fair-
ness or strengthening state legitimacy— is by no means a simple 
task. One cannot assess how well a tax administration is func-
tioning, let alone suggest how to improve it, without taking into 
account not only the environment in which it has to function, 
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tional infrastructure with which it has been equipped. Com-
plexity and its implications for tax administration have long 
been a concern even in the most developed countries. Even the 
most sophisticated tax administration can easily be overloaded 
with impossible tasks. Such concerns are critical in countries in 
which inevitably less than perfect administrators are asked to 
tackle inherently complex tasks in a generally hostile and often 
information-poor environment. The life of tax administrators 
in many countries is made even more complicated by the pro-
pensity of governments to alter tax legislation annually, or even 
more frequently.  
Simple exhortations to “do better” are of little use to re-
source-strapped administrators faced with difficult tasks. Nor 
are the various gimmicks or quick fixes that seem to come easily 
to the minds of clever policy designers of much use in resolving 
tax  administration  problems.  Experience  around  the  world 
demonstrates that the single most important ingredient for ef-
fective tax administration is clear recognition of its importance 
at high political levels and the willingness to support good ad-
ministrative practices—even if it is politically difficult to do so. 
Few developing countries have been able to leap this initial 
hurdle. At times, urged by international agencies or simply des-
perate to get more revenues, countries have launched frantic 
efforts to corral defaulters or to rope in new taxpayers without 
hurting politically powerful interests, and without providing 
the time, resources, and the consistent long-term political sup-
port needed to support and administer an effective tax system. 
The widespread reluctance to collect taxes efficiently and effec-
tively may be understandable in countries that are fragile po-
litically, but without such efforts, no viable long-term tax sys-
tem can possibly be put into place. If the political will is there, 
the techniques needed for effective tax administration are not a 
secret.
Tax Administration Tasks 
The three major tasks of an effective tax administration are fa-
cilitating compliance by ensuring that individuals obligated to 
pay taxes are doing so and to try and make compliance easier for 
the taxpayer; enforcing compliance and reducing tax evasion; 
and improving governance to keep tax officials honest and rein-
force the legitimacy of the tax system.
Facilitating compliance 
The first task of any tax administration is to facilitate compli-
ance: ensure that those who should be in the system are in the 
system, and that they comply with the rules. To do so:
1.  Taxpayers must be found. If they are required to register, the 
registration process should be as easy as possible. Systems 
must be in place to identify those who do not register volun-
tarily. Tax authorities should adopt an appropriate unique 
taxpayer identification system to facilitate compliance and 
enforcement. 
2.  The administration needs a process to determine tax liabilities. 
This may be done administratively (as with most property 
taxes) or by some self-assessment procedure (as with most 
income taxes and value-added taxes [VATs]; see box 1 for 
more information on VATs). Recently, as discussed later, in 
some countries, really “smart” administrations have changed 
the game sustantially by increasingly prefilling tax returns 
with information obtained from reliable third-party sources.
3.  Taxes must be collected. In many countries, the best solution 
is collection through the banking system. It is seldom appro-
priate for tax officials to handle money directly.
4.  The authorities should provide adequate taxpayer services in 
the form of information, pamphlets, forms, advice agencies, 
payment facilities, telephonic and electronic filing, and so 
on, to make taxpayer compliance as easy as possible.
This approach rests on treating the taxpayer as a client to be 
served and not a thief to be caught. Unfortunately, the latter 
attitude still prevails in many countries. 
Enforcing compliance 
Of course, some taxpayers are not honest, so enforcing compli-
ance and reducing tax evasion are also important tasks. To en-
force  compliance  and  reduce  evasion,  the  administration 
needs to understand the extent and nature of the potential tax 
base to estimate the tax gap, preferably by sector and type. 
Without at least some idea of the number and type of individ-
uals and firms not complying, no coherent enforcement strat-
egy can be devised. Sometimes the problem is that large groups 
of prospective taxpayers are simply not known to the authori-
ties. Or it may be that many taxpayers who are in the system 
are substantially under-reporting. Without some knowledge of 
the unreported base, and its determinants, no administration 
can properly allocate its resources to improve tax collection 
and ensure everyone bears at least a roughly fair share of the tax 
burden.
In addition to exploring the nature of the tax gap and ex-
tending the reach of the tax system into the informal economy 
to the extent feasible, close attention must also be paid to such 
simple tasks as ensuring that those who are in the system file on 
time and pay the amounts due. Immediate follow-up to contact 
nonfilers and taxpayers whose payments did not match their 
liabilities is often neglected. Adequate interest charges must be 
imposed on late payments to ensure that nonpayment of taxes 
does not become a cheap source of finance. Similarly, an ade-
quate penalty structure is needed to ensure that those who 
should register do so, that those who should file do so, and that 
those who under-report their tax bases are sufficiently penal-
ized to deter tax evasion. 
Improving governance 
A third major task is to also keep the tax collectors honest. No 
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payers believe the tax structure is unfair or that the revenue 
collected is not effectively used. But even a sound tax struc-
ture and sound expenditure policy can be tarnished by a capri-
cious and corrupt tax administration. Developed countries 
took centuries to develop and implement systems to prevent 
dishonest tax officials from corrupt practices. One key factor 
to reduce corruption is to adequately compensate tax officials 
so that they do not need to steal to live. Ideally, tax officials 
should be professionally trained, promoted on the basis of 
merit, and judged by their adherence to the strictest standards 
of legality and morality. Temptation should be reduced by 
limiting direct contact between officials and taxpayers and in-
creasing supervision when there is direct contact. Developing 
countries trying to sustain relatively large governments on 
precarious fiscal foundations find it hard to deal with these 
various issues. 
Lessons from International Experience
There is no single prescription—no secret recipe—that, once in-
troduced,  will  ensure  improved  tax  administration  in  any 
country. Countries exhibit a wide variety of tax compliance 
levels, reflecting not only the effectiveness of their tax adminis-
trations, but also taxpayer attitudes toward taxation and gov-
ernment in general. Attitudes affect intentions and intentions 
affect behavior. Attitudes are formed in a social context by such 
factors as the perceived level of evasion, the perceived fairness 
of the tax structure, its complexity and stability, how it is ad-
ministered, the value attached to government activities, and 
the legitimacy of government. Government policies affecting 
any of these factors may influence taxpayer attitudes and hence 
the observed level of taxpayer compliance. Countries and cir-
cumstances differ, but some basic points seem universal.
The VAT is often described as a self-assessed tax because 
once  established,  it  becomes  part  of  standard  business 
operations and runs itself. The task of the tax administration 
is thus not to assess who owes what, but instead to guard the 
“borders” of the system and verify that those who should be 
self-assessing are behaving responsibly. 
For such a self-assessed tax to function properly, seven 
preconditions must be in place: 
1. a simple, clear, stable law, 
2. a good taxpayer service, 
3. simple procedures, 
4. effective enforcement, 
5. reasonable audit, 
6. strict penalties, and 
7. a good administrative review system.
In  reality,  of  course,  many  developing  countries  that 
have VATs do not satisfy many—or sometimes any—of these 
preconditions. One cannot take a tax administration out of its 
environment, and such factors as the level and distribution 
of  income  and  wealth,  the  importance  and  pattern  of 
international trade, the relative size and nature of the informal 
sector, the relative importance of final and intermediate sales, 
the prevailing level of trust in government, and taxpayer morale 
all enter into understanding both the present administrative 
situation  and  the  prospects  of  improving  its  outcomes.  To 
implement a modern VAT successfully, a country needs not 
only the right tax structure, it also needs both the right tax 
administration and the right clientele (taxpayers).
To  get  to  this  happy  position,  however,  some  very 
fundamental changes in underlying economic and political 
conditions may first be necessary—and perhaps unlikely, at 
least in the short run. Nonetheless, even with a relatively weak 
administration in an unfavorable environment, with the right 
VAT, a country may be better off. Almost every country needs a 
general consumption tax, and since the VAT is the best form of 
such a tax—the one with the fewest bad effects—the case for 
a VAT is strong almost everywhere on administrative grounds. 
For example, in a poor country with a high import component 
in its taxable consumption tax base, the tax office no longer 
has  to  prove  that  a  duty-free  import  had  been  improperly 
claimed.  Instead,  taxpayers  have  to  demonstrate,  by  filing 
returns, that they were entitled to offset the VAT on imports 
against the VAT on sales. 
Because  in  many  countries  the  informal  sector  is 
“fed” largely by the diversion of tax-free imports, stopping 
this leakage would constitute a major step toward restoring 
the  competitive  balance  between  formal  and  informal 
sectors. So long as it can identify and track VAT registrants, 
the country thus can both have more revenue and at the 
same  time  stimulate  a  sounder  pattern  of  development. 
Tax  administration  can  often  be  a  serious  constraint  on 
tax  reform,  and  countries  should  be  both  encouraged 
and helped to improve their administrations as much as 
reasonably possible. With just minor changes in tax structure 
and administration, significant improvements in outcomes 
may be achieved even in very poor countries.
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Keep it simple 
One important lesson suggested by experience is that before re-
forming the tax administration, simplify the tax system so that 
it can be applied effectively in a low-compliance context. It sel-
dom makes sense to reform tax administration without simul-
taneously reforming tax structure to be both sensible and ad-
ministrable. Considerable improvements can often be made in 
administration by small simplifications in tax policy. Reducing 
the number of income tax deductions, for instance, may permit 
countries to eliminate filing requirements for most wage earn-
ers. In addition to giving the administration simpler and more 
enforceable laws to administer, it is equally important to sim-
plify procedures for taxpayers, for example, by eliminating de-
mands for unnecessary information in tax returns and consoli-
dating  return  and  payment  forms.  Once  procedures  are 
simplified, the tax administration can then concentrate on its 
main  tasks:  facilitating  compliance,  monitoring  compliance, 
and dealing with noncompliance.
The taxpayer as client 
The prevalent attitude in many tax administrations appears to 
be that all taxpayers are potential criminals. The key adminis-
trative problems are then identifying and controlling taxpay-
ers and catching those who cheat. These tasks are indeed im-
portant, and this emphasis is understandable in a country 
undergoing rapid transition, but problems of tax enforcement 
cannot be solved simply by calling in the “tax police.” Exten-
sive research in a number of countries shows that there is 
much to be gained from viewing taxpayers more as clients—
perhaps  not  very  willing  clients,  but  still  clients—than  as 
would-be criminals. 
As mentioned earlier, facilitating compliance requires im-
proving services to taxpayers by providing them clear instruc-
tions, understandable forms, and assistance and information as 
necessary. Monitoring compliance requires the establishment 
and maintenance of taxpayer current accounts, management 
information systems that cover both ultimate taxpayers and 
third-party agents (such as banks) involved in the tax system, 
and appropriate and prompt procedures to detect and follow up 
on nonfilers and late payments. Improving compliance requires 
a judicious mix of both these approaches as well as additional 
measures to deter noncompliance, such as establishing a reason-
able risk of detection and the effective application of penalties. 
Successful reform strategies require an appropriate mix of all 
these approaches.
Of course, rewriting reality so that citizens are induced to 
comply with tax laws voluntarily is difficult in countries that 
face severe institutional limitations arising from large informal 
sectors, poor salary structures for public servants, ineffective 
and uncertain legal systems, and an entrenched distrust of gov-
ernment. Nonetheless, services to taxpayers that facilitate re-
porting, filing and paying taxes, or that impart education or in-
formation among citizens about their obligations under the tax 
laws are often as or more cost-effective in securing compliance 
than measures such as auditing and penalties, which are more 
directly designed to counter noncompliance. The taxpayer ser-
vice perspective emphasizes reducing taxpayer uncertainty by 
clarifying legal ambiguities, often about issues as simple as the 
tax  rate  applicable  to  certain  transactions,  communicating 
clearly what the law is, and ceasing to change it so often that no 
one quite knows what it is. Taxpayer compliance costs and con-
venience should also be taken into account in designing legal 
and administrative procedures: for example, some countries 
require excessive numbers of tax payments to be made in in-
convenient places. 
Taxpayers do not always view the decision to pay or not as a 
simple gamble. Some always pay; some always cheat; and some 
cheat when they think they can get away with it. An important 
task of tax administration is to prevent the mix from tipping in 
the direction of pervasive noncompliance. Optimal enforce-
ment strategy anywhere is likely to include both rewards for 
compliers and penalties for noncompliers. But the correct mix 
depends on many context-specific factors such as the value at-
tached to “fairness,” and its meaning; the degree of deference to 
authority, and the legitimacy attached to that authority; and 
the extent to which contributing to the finance of government 
activities is seen to be socially desirable.  This picture is not as 
simple as the conventional economic model of tax evasion, 
where penalties and probabilities of detecting evasion are seen 
as driving taxpayer compliance decisions. Increased enforce-
ment actions, or lessened enforcement such as an amnesty, may 
have quite different results on compliers than on noncompli-
ers, as may increased efforts at public education about taxpayer 
rights and obligations or increased efforts by tax authorities to 
provide improved service to taxpayers. 
Salvation through reorganization?
Despite the high potential payoff in terms of increased revenue, 
it is usually difficult, and often impossible, for tax departments 
to obtain and retain qualified staff or even to meet such basic 
material needs as office space and computers. Tax administra-
tors are civil servants and hence subject to all the constraints 
affecting civil services. Reform strategies that require substan-
tial additional administrative resources—particularly staff—are 
hence usually doomed to failure, because the needed resources 
will not materialize fully or in a timely fashion. 
One way around this problem is to set up independent rev-
enue authorities that are to some extent freed from civil service 
restrictions on hiring and pay and may also be given access to 
some earmarked source of revenue. Experience with this ap-
proach has been mixed. In some instances, the result appears to 
have been to provide an institutional structure that provides a 
useful catalyst for deeper administrative reform. In other in-
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functional bureacracy. A tentative conclusion is perhaps that 
any country that has the will, strategy, and resources to reform 
tax administration probably does not need an independent rev-
enue authority—and a country in which these critical ingredi-
ents are lacking is unlikely to be successful even if it creates such 
an authority.
Whether there is a semiautonomous authority or not, suc-
cessful administrative reform strategies must usually be carried 
out without major additional resources. One approach may be 
simply to eliminate unproductive activities such as the auditing 
the returns of most wage earners; another may be to consider 
outsourcing some of the activities traditionally carried on with-
in the administration; and yet another may be to focus efforts 
more on the larger business taxpayers, who not only pay taxes 
themselves (for example, on imports and profits), but also col-
lect much of the revenue in every country through payroll, in-
come, sales, and excise taxes and thus serve a critical function in 
providing information on their owners, employees, suppliers, 
and customers. None of these approaches is without its own 
complications, but all may, if properly employed, improve out-
comes without incurring serious revenue risks. 
The IT solution 
No modern tax administration can perform its tasks efficiently 
without using modern information techology (IT). Among the 
areas that may be computerized are: (1) taxpayer records and 
tax collection; (2) internal management and control over re-
sources; (3) legal structure and procedures; and (4) systems to 
lower taxpayer compliance costs. 
Tax administrations increasingly need IT expertise because 
some of their most important clients—multinational compa-
nies and, increasingly, large domestic firms—employ sophisti-
cated computer systems that are beyond the investigative capac-
ity of technologically backward tax administrations. 
 Experience provides a number of lessons for the successful 
application of IT in tax administration: 
•. Most importantly, an appropriate strategy must be devel-
oped  that  takes  into  account  the  obstacles  and  the  con-
straints arising from organizational rigidities such as civil 
service salary structure and procedural hurdles in acquiring 
the necessary expertise, hardware, and software. 
•. Considerable organizational reengineering, such as consoli-
dating return and payment forms, eliminating unnecessary 
and unused information required from taxpayers, and so 
on, is usually needed to prepare the tax administration for a 
computerized environment.
•. Equipment  and  software  should  be  standardized  and 
bought off the shelf whenever possible to facilitate opera-
tion, networking, and maintenance. 
•. The pace of change and the success of any modernization 
program depend ultimately on the training and skills of the 
people who are expected to use the technology. Appropriate 
incentives and accountability measures are also needed. 
•. As mentioned earlier, for IT to work at all, a unique identifi-
cation number must be assigned to each taxpayer.
Perhaps the ultimate example of an automated, Web-based, 
IT-driven tax system is one like that introduced by Denmark in 
2004. Under the “no touch” system now in place in Denmark, 
which provides extensively prefilled returns online, most tax-
payers—over 90 percent—no longer need to file returns or to 
have any direct contact with the administration, thus reducing 
compliance  costs  and  freeing  substantial  administrative  re-
sources to deal with more complex administrative problems 
such as auditing complex or questionable returns. The future 
of smart tax administration seems increasingly to lie in this di-
rection. For many poor countries, that future may still lie some 
distance ahead. However, countries such as the Slovak Repub-
lic, Singapore, and Chile have already moved in this direction to 
a considerable extent, and other middle-income countries may 
do so in the near future.
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